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Why Western Law Theories do not 
settle religious issues?1
Daniel Nunes Pereira2
“We are sinful not merely because we have eaten of the tree of knowledge, 
but also because we have not eaten of the tree of life.”
Kafka - Die Zürauer Aphorismen
Resumo
 O presente estudo aborda a dificuldade em considerar a lacuna entre ideal/real nos 
fenômenos jurídicos e religiosos e procura entender os motivos e razões da incapacidade 
do quadro jurídico ocidental em lidar com os problemas decorrentes de práticas religiosas. 
O artigo parte do pressuposto de que a humanidade se define unicamente por meio de 
objetos sociais em que se manifesta de forma compacta e concentrada. Há uma dimensão 
transversal ao gênero humano que funciona de forma ativa ou latente em toda o campo de 
dada realidade social, o que não se encaixaria na imanência do Direito. A transversalidade 
da religião e suas reverberações em outras esferas da vida humana demanda a revisão 
de questões concernentes ao nexo deontológico que existe no Direito. Assim, conclui o 
presente estudo, o problema da lacuna entre “Ser e Dever-Ser”, principalmente na Teoria 
do Direito, pode ser localizado precipuamente na relação binomial entre “Religião-praxis 
/Lei-techné”
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Abstract
 The present study addresses the difficulty regarded on the gap between ideal/real 
on law and religion phenomena, and seeks to understand the motives and reasons for 
the inability of the western legal framework to deal with problems arising from religious 
practices. The paper starts from the assumption that mankind is not defined solely 
through social objects in which manifests itself in compact and concentrated way. There 
is a transverse dimension on humankind that works in active or latent way in the entire 
thickness of social reality, which does not fit in the immanence of Law. The transversality 
of religion and its reverberations in other spheres of human life is bounden to review 
the issue of deontological nexus that exists in the law. Thus, in this study concluding 
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remarks, the problem of the gap on “Is-Ought problem” prevailing on Law Theory, may 
be primarily located in the binomial relation “Religion-praxis/Law-techné”.
Keywords: Philosophy of law; political philosophy; religion; theory of law.
Introduction
This paper questions arises from the difficulty regarded on the gap between 
ideal/real concerning Law (practice and theory) and religion (understood as a 
sociological phenomenon and also metaphysical experience). Under such issue the 
present study seeks to understand the motives and reasons for the inability of the 
Western legal framework to deal with problems arising from religious practices.
From these assertions, we may assume (hypothetically) that both Law and 
Religion have implicitly epistemological senses and forming practices. Whenever 
it comes to any problem in the world of experience, i.e., a “Social Fact”3, to 
be contemplated by law, there is a subject/object relation, in which the later 
emerges from the empirical, while the first is both the operator and “telos” of 
the law. However, religion is regarded as both, a social fact and a transcendent 
phenomenon to the subject, which means it is some phenomenical category apart 
from ordinary and secular affairs.
A socio-historical analysis on Western Modernity, concludes (or may imply) 
that religion, rather than disappearing from the modern world (as Weber and Freud 
forecasted), became one of several possibilities of belief in the social imaginary 
(TAYLOR, 2007, p. 209). Under such predication, the present study starts from 
the assumption that man in religion is not defined solely through social objects in 
which manifests itself in compact and concentrated way, since there would be a 
transverse dimension of the human phenomenon, which works in active or latent 
way, in the entire thickness of social reality, according to procedures specific to 
each society, which does not fit in the immanence of the legal normative text. 
Such transversality of religion and the reverberations in other spheres of human 
life is bounden to review the issue of deontological nexus that exists in the law. 
Thus, the problem of the gap on “Is-Ought problem” (or “Sein-Sollen”) prevailing 
on Law Theory, may be primarily located in the binomial relation “Religion-
praxis/ Law-techné”. 
In order to question the interaction between Law and Religion, the 
present study assumes that both of them lie inexorably intertwined with 
politics, such that certain relations generate social and psychological attitudes 
that may or may not become formally religious and/or legal. Thus, the 
underlying religious category is provided by the striking analogy between the 
behavior of the individual to the deity and behavior towards society. A critically 
important aspect is the sense of dependency (SIMMEL, 1997, p. 110). The 
3 Hereby understood as “fait social” or “Sozialer Tatbestand” on Durkheim (and sometimes 
post-weberian) terminology.
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problem seems to be that metaphysical dimension, the one that transcends the 
individual, is contained on human religiosity, however, subjective religiosity 
does not guarantee the existence of a realm beyond metaphysics, such as legal 
normativity (SIMMEL, 1997, p. 14). On such quarrel the present study starts 
its rhetorical contention from the idea that religious phenomena arises as some 
kind of rationalization of the world4.
Religion and its Epistemological Senses
Aiming to get hold of Religion as a Social issue (therefore also political 
and legal matter), this study returns to the classical mainstream of Sociology 
of Religion - Max Weber. The German sociologist is often regarded to take 
an objective and (some say) distant view of the sociological traditions of the 
institutions of religions, specially its inner human gearing. The work of Weber, 
before settling its quarrels on rationality and disenchantment, starts from 
searching some stipulation concerning the guidance of the Human Reason as 
part of ‘Being’5 (KOCH, 1994, p.2). The ontological question in Weber contrasts 
with other classics, such as Durkheim and Marx, precisely because it structures its 
(then new) sociology of comprehension. Weber’s ontology tries to give account on 
transcendence and immanence of the social body, and inquires how subjectified 
facts become objectified facticities, and eventually, how can they be socially 
shared. Bergman and Luckmann (1991 pp. 28, 29) locate and describe Weber’s 
ontology in the Ideengeschichte6 of Social Sciences:
The central question for sociological theory can then be put 
as follows: How is it possible that subjective meanings become 
objective facticities? Or, in terms appropriate to the aforementioned 
theoretical positions: How is it possible that human activity 
(‘Handeln’) should produce a world of things (chases)? In other 
words, an adequate understanding of the ‘reality sui generis’ of 
society requires an inquiry into the manner in which this reality is 
constructed. This inquiry, we maintain, is the task of the sociology 
of knowledge. (BERGER, LUCKMANN, 1991, p. 29)
4 The epistemological orientation of the present study is in accordance to the Rational 
Transcendentalism (also present in the phenomenology of Husserl) and the analytic 
philosophy of Wittgenstein (in its two phases). Thus, the paper confines itself to what can be 
arguably disputable, delimiting what is thinkable (WITTGENSTEIN, 2010, p.179), so, the 
“psychologizing” of structures and relations between entities is something unrelated to this 
discussion.
5 Understood as metaphysical and ontological issue (JAMES, 1916, p.39) – albeit hereby 
concerning Social Science.
6 Usually translated as “History of Ideas”. However, the original German word is more accurate 
to describe and circumscribe such subject as epistemological category because of its inter and 
transdisciplinary method (BEVIR, 1999, p. 32)
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To answer this question (the interaction between the subjective and the 
transcendent which creates objective facticities) Weber starts from the assumption 
that all human beings seek a subjectively meaningful guidance to the world, which 
would be the source of both the religion and knowledge (WEBER 1978, p. 499). 
The religious orientations have their origins in inner psychological desire to search 
or training intellectual shaping of meaning and unity of the world (KOCH, 1994, 
p.4). In this sense, the human mind is led to reflect on ethical and religious issues, 
and not by material need, but by inner compulsion to understand the world as a 
significant Cosmos and take a position in relation to itself, i.e., an attempt to tune 
and suit human uncertain understanding to a portentously ineffable empirical 
reality (WEBER 2004, pp. 282, 416-418).
Therefore, a metaphysical orientation, in theory, can assist in obtaining 
control over the external world of objects and provides the individual a subjective 
and functional significance. (WEBER, 1958a: 136, 137) The individual has a 
psychological need for ethical guidance and a practical need for such orientation 
to the world of objects. The guidance is necessary because a person has to act7 
in the world but this action shall not be random, since the individual acts as 
a vector result of motives or agencies (KOCH, 1994, p.4). In other words, 
even rhetorically, it is necessary just one reason8 to provide the “meaning” or 
“intelligible reason” for our actions. As Weber suggested, we can describe the 
actions of a person who writes a numerical equation on a piece of paper, but to 
understand the reasons to such behavior it is necessary to infer, or even know, 
what motivated this particular action. (WEBER 1978, p. 8) Weber suggested that 
material and ideal interests provide the motivation for action (WEBER, 1958b, 
p.280), and these “ideal interests” are the ethical guidance which humankind 
owe to the world (KOCH 1994, p.4). If every individual has the need to seek a 
rational orientation to the world, in which ontological conditions such guidance 
occurs? In other words: what are the conditions of human existence that serve 
to impound the available knowledge in conducting any action? At this point, 
the legacy of Kantian epistemology is evident in Weber work (KOCH, 1994, 
p. 5). The human mind confronts the external reality, regardless of whether this 
proves as strictly physical or social, but always occurs as a strange and separate 
object of the mind. The dualism inherent in this position has its origins in the 
epistemology of Kant (1958). The fundamental ideas of modern epistemology, 
including religion studies, ultimately derived from the Kantian philosophical 
building, as Weber himself assumes (WEBER, 1949, p. 106). The implications 
of this epistemological position are numerous, since the Kantian system is built 
on the notion of a distinction between the empirical world and the intelligibility 
realm (KANT 1958, p. 26), in such a way that man knows the empirical world 
through the action of the senses and the mind activity. However, the mind is 
limited in its ability to capture the empirical reality, due to the limited nature of 
the mechanisms employees towards understanding (Categories). The Categories 
7 It is noteworthy that Weber’s work is essentially a sociology of human action (GERTH, 
MILLS, 1958, p. 70-75)
8 Strictly we should say ‘Triebfeder’, sometimes translated as ‘motivation’, on kantian lexicon. 
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of experience, our perceptual epistemological body, (which construct religious 
understanding) never transmit the complexity of the true nature of any object. 
Therefore, the objective reality lies in the field of metaphysics, so in being 
achievable only the appearance of reality. (KANT, 1958, p. 54).
As a result of such Weberian and Kantian epistemological view, we may 
assume that each event in the social world also has a complex nature which 
human mind is unable to understand in its entirety. Hypothetically, even a 
minimal description of a slice of mere ordinary fact can never be exhausted from 
the categories of the individual (WEBER, 1949, p. 78). This means that the 
parameters of social knowledge are restricted, which lies a problem defining a 
universalizing method to any aspect of social intelligible world (as Marx attempts 
to). The acceptance of the Kantian dualism on Weber understanding of Religion 
form the core of methodological strategy used in the study of social reality. As 
a separate object of empirical reality, the rational mind is to deal with a reality 
that is a foreign object itself, devoid of a priori sense - so science and religion 
build these directions, which are not predicates to the ‘Real World’ ineffable to 
human mind. In the study of society, as in the study of physical objects, their 
events will never be understood in its entirety, so the social world requires 
interpretation, sometimes through science, sometimes religion - both are methods 
of disenchantment9 and rationalization of World, apparently itself meaningless, 
and therefore unreadable10. But, among such rationalizations, where would be the 
Law and Normative Order?
Normativity and its Dissentient Schematics on Social 
Facts
To expatiate on Legal Theory of the twenty century (and early twenty-first) 
is perforce to discourse on Hans Kelsen contribution on such lore. The Kelsenean 
perspective is unavoidable, even to its detractors. Even if this study (or any other) 
tries to appeal and recourse to authors like Hart, Dworkin, Rawls or even Ross11, 
none of them would have the ability to analytically deconstruct and reedify our 
very Episteme12 of Law as we know it (understood both as “Lex aut Iuria”, or 
“Gesetz oder Recht”).
9 Strictly from the weberian concept of “Entzauberung der Welt”.
10 The weberian epistemological construct (in Ontology-way) what is essential is the search for 
knowledge, not gnosiological founding itself, and that distinguishes Max Weber from other 
Liberals, according to Merleau-Ponty (2006, pp 1- 2). Yet, it urges to point that there isn’t 
such natural and necessary opposition between Weber and Marx – “Weber does not squarely 
oppose historical materialism as altogether wrong; he merely takes exception to its claim of 
stablishing a single and universal causal sequence”. (GERTH, MILLS, 1958, p. 47).
11 Jürgen Habermas, in some accordance with kelsenean theory, shall have some role ahead this 
paper argumentation,
12 The present study evokes the ‘Episteme” idea under Foucault, i.e. “(...) conditions of 
possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice” 
(FOUCAULT, 1966, p. 168).
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Concerning valuational questions, the Kelsen’s theory is confluent and 
tributary to Kant’s work, while under “scientific” terms it fits into the context of 
the Vienna Circle, especially because of the parallels (not always in accordance) 
with the natural sciences (POSNER, 2001: 3). However, it is of utmost importance 
the Kantian heritage related to a particular reading of the work of David Hume, 
specially his “Treatise of Human Nature” and the “ought-is” problem (HUME, 
2011, p. 335). Hume the eventual possibility to infer a rule of conduct from 
a description of something that just happens in the world of empiricism, such 
as religious acts or beliefs. As a logical consequence, it is not feasible to build a 
moral-normative system from any ontological belief. Wherefore, apparently, is 
impossible to carry over the “Being” (or “Is”) to “It should be,” (or “ought to”), 
i.e., to infer values from facts. Kant (1958, p. 72), distinguishes this disjunction 
among judgments and valuations between the Pure Reason that is expressed in 
the indicative about the judgments about reality (“Sein”13), and Practical Reason, 
which is expressed by imperatives (“Sollen”).
From the Kantian interpretation of Hume’s work, Kelsen structures his 
theory of normativity from writs propositions. For Kelsen the object of some 
science of the Law (which is the law itself ) should, to some extent, be explained 
from explanatory methodologies from natural sciences, which aims to explain 
the actual and factual behavior of materiality. Such explanation establishes causal 
relationship to the empirical result, present in the sensible world, which “must 
necessarily” (“muβ”) occur (KELSEN 2003, p.86) and can be expressed in a 
similar way to natural laws (“gemuβt”). Under natural law cause and effect does 
not admit exceptions therefore “must” occur (“müβen”).
The legal norm, as opposed to the natural law, is not able and cannot express 
the factual occurrence of something, i.e., lying on empirically cadre of the “Being” 
(“Sein”), therefore it isn’t a logical and mandatory result of a necessary relation of cause 
and effect (“Gemuβt”). Unlike causality relations (v.g. religious social phenomena), the 
legal standard provides that, in certain circumstances, something is necessarily due in 
normative sense (“Gesollt”). Therefore, the Law (understood as “Iuria” or “Recht”), 
subject to its own science, must consist on groups of normative statements concerning 
the idea of “Should Be” (“Sollen”). Such statements are observed by Jurisprudence from 
legal propositions, which consist of normative causal links between any factual support 
(“Tatbestand”) describing a possible illicit and the State reaction (KELSEN 2003, p. 
126).These relations within “Is – Ought be” problem structure the static dimension 
of legal norm (KELSEN 2003 pp. 121-140), while the staggered hierarchical logic of 
the legal rules substantiates the so-called juridical dynamics, which has a vertex that 
holds an hypothetical last legitimacy towards all other judicial standards (KELSEN 
2003, pp. 215, 221). The problem arises when one tries to establish similarities and 
differences up the normative command to a reality whose entirety is ineffable, as social 
outbreaks of religious nature. In theory, the law, with the aim of dealing with it, seems 
13 Some specific words shall be consigned on both ways: its original idiom and some translation, 
in order to maintain the lexical specificity of the expression.
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to make a certain syncretism of analytical categories such as “Interpretation”, “Sense” 
and “Significance”. (AMSELEK 2011, p. 42). This structural scheme of the legal 
norm might seem puzzled or inconsistent in the face of complex social phenomena, 
as the norm would guide human actions, and that itself (the norm) is a sense, i.e., the 
significance of an act of volition (KELSEN 2003, p. 392)
To unravel this assertion we must assume that a legal norm is necessarily a 
valid standard (which means it is made under and to the extent of another superior 
normative standard) and therefore mandatory, otherwise it would not exist, since 
one that is not endowed with mandatory will not be truly a legal norm; Also, 
validity of the legal norm is the specific mode of existence of juristic standards, 
which always returns (as a rhetorical question) to another standard (on a higher 
legal degree) which is the basis of its legality and enforceability (KELSEN 2003, 
p. 246). Thus, is perceived a retro-feed relation between “Being” (“Sein”) and 
“Ought-to” (“Sollen”) closing the normative world unto itself, shutting himself 
in any interpretation of legal wording. Somehow, social phenomena (including 
religious one) must be phagocytosed into this circular analytical relation. The 
answer seems to be within the logic of both instances – normative and social. But, 
could any action necessarily be determined by rule? Wittgenstein may add some 
ado at this point:
“This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. 
The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, 
then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be 
neither accord nor conflict here.” (WITTGENSTEIN, 1958, p.161)
From this premise (with which Kelsen would seem to agree) believes that 
an act of volition can have different meaning in different patterns. Regardless 
of the subjective meaning given to it by its originator persona, he subjectively 
desires that his commandment is obeyed by those to whom it is addressed: the 
act has the meaning objectively valid in the eyes of jurisdictional and, in theory, 
in the eyes of a third and uninterested person (AMSELEK 2011, p. 43), as an 
extraneous “phainesthai” to the axiological and gnosiological inconsistencies of 
“everything that is the case” 14(WITTGENSTEIN, 2010, p. 134). This question 
of a hypothetical separate and flitted Sense to human experience, as an attempt 
to suit some legal norm to the epistemic multitude of civilization, opposite to the 
contingency of the world and individuality (understood as the Marxian concept 
of “Gattugsmässigkeit”15) appears on Theory of Law as reverberation of formal 
14 §1“Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist” (WITTGENSTEIN, 2010, p. 134).
15 Especially in Lukács, the concept of “Gattugsmässigkeit” constitutes the ultimate ontological 
foundation of the individuation process, with only real existence as a social being, so that outside 
society, there is not any possible individuation (LUKÁCS, 2012. p. 196). However, the term 
developed in extensive way by the Hungarian philosopher naturally refers to Marx himself. 
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logic studies in the early twentieth century (GREEN, 2003, p.367). Regarding, 
therefore, the logic of a particular legal system, like any language, it is necessary 
that the interlocutors understand the signs, their structures and can assign 
meanings to express events and phenomena in the given language (or encoding). 
To understand a legal system is to allocate legal meanings to external manifestation 
of human conduct (KELSEN 2003, p. 48) despite its metaphysical and subjective 
meaning (like on religion). Consequently, the legal meanings assigned to single 
events, therefore, should be understood in terms of its functional contribution to 
maintaining the possibility sanction in the long chains of events in which they 
occur. (GREEN, 2003, p. 377).
It may be concluded, regarding the normative system framework, that the 
content of the law is contingent to social facts. As well as the logical analysis 
of language does not explain the meaning of words, logical analysis of legal 
systems does not explain the ratio between single social events and their primeval 
signification (GREEN, 2003, p. 380). In this sense, the early legal meanings can 
be attached by means of rules of imputation to generate basic legal meanings or 
conditions for sanction (etiological condition of legal standards). To interpret legal 
systems is to find a relation between these rules of attribution and the sentence 
structure, which means, to find and understand the sequence of social events that 
must be interpreted – even if these events seems to have no earthly reasonable 
explanation. It seems the problem lies in the communicative16 process. 
Immanence and Transcendence
Whenever it comes to concern any issue from the world of experience, i.e., 
a social fact to be contemplated by law, there is a conceit on a subject/object 
ratio, in which it the later emerges from the empirical orb, while the first is 
both operator and “teleological dictum” of the Law. With regard to this relation, 
what is proposed in this paradigmatic cut is, in short, a “Ptolemaic” perspective 
methodologically reverse to Kantian method, which arises from a “Copernican 
revolution” in philosophy. For such theoretical effort, religion is seen both as 
a social fact and as transcendent to the subject, namely, uranian, apart from 
The original Marxist work does not presuppose an abstract, isolated human individual, so the 
essence of being of each individual, “can only be understood as “gender”(“Gattung”) given 
in your “interiority” (“Innere Als”) as some silent form (“Stumme”), which generally would 
connect to other individuals (MARX, 1978, p. 6). Why, therefore, the human universality of 
the Social Ontology is opposed to human ordinariness naturally set.
16 Cf. Quine: “The unit of communication is the sentence and not the word. This point of 
semantical theory was long obscured by the undeniable primacy, in one respect, of words. 
Sentences being limitless in number and words limited, we necessarily understand most 
sentences by construction from antecedently familiar words. Actually there is no conflict here. 
We can allow the sentences a full monopoly of “meaning” in some sense, without denying 
that the meaning must be worked out. Then we can say that knowing words is knowing how 
to work out the meanings of sentences containing them”. (QUINE, 1981, p. 63).
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ordinary and profane affairs. So, in this epistemic understanding that identifies 
with an opaque reality17 (ŽIŽEK, 2001, p.82-83), lies a specific teleology that 
sees Man (beyond any hedonistic concern) inserted into Mankind (so, not just the 
individual subject) as a center for intellectual reflexion, including (and this is the 
case), the Jurisprudence as Man’s Law. In this Ptolemaic theorizing scheme (one 
may say Geocentric, or, on more rigid philosophical lexicon, Anthropocentric 
thought), the current intellectual lead up proposes the study of some Uranian 
doctrines and disciplines towards the most immanently human concerns. In 
short, this section seeks to determine a starting point in the Anthropic Principle18 
in the construction of legal questioning previously stated. The study targets in the 
humane subject because understands that the religious man is not defined solely 
through social objects in which manifests itself in compact and concentrated way. 
There is, therefore, a transverse dimension of the human phenomenon, which 
works in active or latent way, explicit or implicit, in the entire thickness of social, 
cultural and psychological reality, according to procedures specific to each society 
(SIMMEL, 1997, p. 13).
The metanarrative of humankind can be seen as a dramatic and hopelessly 
painful description of the man’s condition divided between two co-dependent 
and mysterious realities that cannot be fully defined and determined, namely, 
existence and transcendence (JASPERS, 1994, p. 174). Transcendence becomes 
important whenever the world known for empiricism and science does not show 
itself as self-sufficient and cannot be explained by its own categories. In this 
pathway we start from a problem faced by Descartes, and taken up by Edmund 
Husserl (OIZERMAN, 1988, p. 157) – can we ascertain, with absolute certainty, 
what we know from what we just seem knowing? In this sense, we can see us (as 
mankind) as a lonely warm light in the darkness19, through and by which we try 
to name and give forms to uncertain and erratic experiences (sometimes oneiric), 
since the very notion of space/time to the rules of coexistence – and these one 
ultimately, try to keep that very light on. Furthermore, we can still cross the point 
explored by Jaspers to the weberian provisions about religions as rationalizations 
17 In this particular ontological understanding, which its last plea lies in Lacan, the present 
study works on the so-called “ Symbolic Real”, where lie both, religion as praxis and the law 
as techné, still having the “Imaginary Real” that holds the religious transcendence and its 
complete otherness well as the Kantian foundations of today’s Law Theories. The “Real Real” 
presents itself as an epistemic monolith being terrifying and unspeakable, while the reality is 
expressed only on facts and absolute acts such as death, life, sex, etc., which are digested and 
made knowable in the first two instances of “Real” (ŽIŽEK, 2001, 10).
18 Anthropic Principle generally refers to cosmology and physics, and states that any valid 
theory of the universe must be consistent with the very existence of human beings, for which 
the only universe we can see is what has humans. For now we ignore the fact that such a 
theory, in its most pseudo-scientific and vulgar form, lends itself to the nonsense of Christian 
fundamentalist groups, whose doited members refute the evolution of species and related 
theories. Thus the adoption of the concept of the Anthropic Principle in this article aims to 
diverse effect aimed by religious proselytism.
19 As on Wittgenstein yale about the ‘Red Campnula” (WITTGENSTEIN, 2012, p 68).
Daniel Nunes Pereira
152
of the basic problems of the human condition, namely, contingency, impotence 
and scarcity. Given these basic problems, the religious concepts are crucial in 
human societies as guide the search towards direction and meaning to its existence 
and not merely an emotional adjustment, since it creates, in fact, cognitive safety 
when facing problems of suffering and death. Such basic problems persist, hence 
it becomes natural the existence of metaphysical answers, such religious and 
mythical ones (WEBER, 2004: 279. However (and this is the problem), their 
social consequences cannot be naturalized under legal and judicial guise, because 
this social praxis is eminently linguistic, ergo uncertain and precarious 20.
Given this transversality of religion and its reverberations in other spheres of 
human life, it is necessary to review the issue of the deontic of law from holistic 
understanding of problems arising from the relation between religion and the 
law. Thus, the problem of the gap between “Is” and should “Ought-to” in-law, 
concerning the object of this study, it may be primarily located in the binomium 
Religion-practice/Law-Technique, however, this binomial relation seems to be 
developed from a clinamen perspective of the “Imaginary Real”. This means 
that what really is criticized is the conflict and the chimera resulting from the 
antagonism between some legal framework and the various religious practices, 
so, the core of the criticism is an anthropogenic legal deontic confronted to some 
source of religious transcendence.
Both Law and Religion have implicitly teleological senses that form their 
practices. It is, therefore, urging to understand the particular difficulties regarded 
in the gap between ideal/real, and seeking some deep meaning of the religious fact, 
it supposes the existence of sense and meanings expressed on these experiences. 
The phenomenological method applied to the analysis of the religious fact, seeks, 
towards the achievement of it purpose, to promote phenomenological reduction 
(HUSSERL, 2008, p. 85), as from this procedure it is possible to catch the 
universal symbolic structures of religious phenomena. Religious thought is the 
result of an idea and a power of transcendence that is in the human being. But his 
is born such feeling of transcendence? In the genesis of the notion of transcendence 
lies the lack of slow and transgenerational events (SLOTERDIJK, 2009, pp. 20-
24), as well as unknowable facts regarded as violent, brutal (as in “Real Real” 
described by Žižek – 2010, p. 10) also, the the inability to one really reaches the 
other, and perhaps most importantly, the fact of human consciousness entails the 
ability to submit an intelligence that exceeds itself. On the other hand there is also 
depth of the human being, which allegedly lies in its religious dimension, in tune 
to something that unconditionally touches the individual. This depth of human 
beings actually lies in the absurdity of his existence (CAMUS, 2005, pp. 86), 
20 Again, the study searches some root on Wittgenstein (now the later one): “We are talking 
about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-
temporal phantasm. . . . But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating 
the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties. The question “What is a word really?” 
is analogous to ‘What is a piece in chess?’ ” (WITTGENSTEIN, 1958, p. 108).
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and his inability to deal with it gives vent to alleged manifestations of the sacred, 
exercises on imagination and the consequent creation of so-called myths. The 
“sacred” is therefore a means of backing and resignation in the face of an existence 
that has the power to annihilate us, and manifests itself not only in everyday 
things, but through everyday things (ELIADE, 2010, p.17 ). In some irruption 
of the sacred (called hierophany) it is experienced some alleged religious breath, 
all of nature can manifest as cosmic sacredness21. But how come such ineffable 
experience is to be put on words, or mere human signs of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’? 
It just does not happen.
Concluding Remarks - Transcendence towards 
Immanence
The strangeness of the Law concerning Religion are superimposed the 
functionalists teleologies of both phenomena, antithetically opposed to each 
other. Namely, religion acts as Social Solvent while the Law can be a Social 
Dinamogenic.22 The law attempts to rationalize facts and their logical sequence, 
including the phenomenal emanations gait of religion. However, the legal system 
does not share a generalized logic, immanent, through functional premises and 
conclusions (PERELMAN, 2004, p.46) so that applies directly to the world 
of empirical facts. The Law, therefore, does not share a pure logic, connected 
to the earliest reasons of Philosophy, but comes to organized thinking as a 
manifestation of knowledge, which seeks “Truth”, similar to metaphysics and 
ontology. Unlike these two matters, however, the logical and legal methodology 
deal with criteria for some particular goal can be achieved, so it is merely a 
mean, no ant end. In a first completion of the strangeness of the Law to religious 
phenomenon, there is the ontological-transcendental idiosyncrasy of the latter 
that is not consistent to some mere rationalization of the facts, which derives 
from immanentist reasoning. Jurisprudence and its object, the Law, seeks, at 
first, enable the achievement of social purposes that couldn’t be attain except 
through this same form of social control. That’s how Law fosters particular 
purpose through promotion of abstract ideas and attitudes of its participants in 
a legally cohesive society, dynamogenically united. Such promotional function 
of social dynamogenic is accomplished through mechanisms of encouragement 
and discouragement, from a functional perspective (BOBBIO, 2007, p.19), the 
latter are used in order to unite the disparate, while discouragement measures 
are used in order to preserve social cohesion, that is, some maintenance of the 
status quo of society.
21 As in Mystical Experience told by Bergson (1932, p. 127) or Hume’s Demea (HUME, 2005, 
p. 94).
22 On parallel with chemistry and physiology, it is the idea of scaling some functional activity 
resulting from action of an exciter and agglomerating agent on a particular set of originally 
separate units.
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Religion in its social functionality, inasmuch on the realm of “Sein”, collides 
with the Law, as “Sollen”, in its dynamogenic functionality, in such a way that 
works as a social solvent. Such an interpretation is a Weberian sociological tradition 
against some of Durkheim’s ideas, in order to position the parallax between 
traditional cultures to Judeo-Christian civilization. If the French sociologist saw 
that aboriginal cultures had their individuals united by religion (DURKHEIM, 
2009, p.457), on the medieval-modern monotheistic culture, religion had the 
capacity to dissolve old belongings and established cultural lines (PIERUCCI, 
2006, p. 120), including (nowadays) the law, as the very notion of Democracy, 
Secularism and Human Rights, in theory. The proselytizing universalist religion, 
i.e., with individual salvation proposal, tends to predominate over other socio-
cultural phenomena (including the democratic state) and functions as a device 
that disconnects people from their cultural context of origin.
A crisis factor on Representative Democracy remains in its foundation 
rooted in Rousseau’s “Volonté Générale”, in view of the increasingly complex and 
compartmentalized society groups, in such a way that no longer sees a general will 
in which some assembly or parliament can be guided, but multiple and plural 
volitions, that legitimately dispute the prevalence in the political arena. The 
political faction that momentarily prevails misses the accession of multiple overdue 
volitions, which aggravates some feeling of mismatch between representatives 
and represented groups. Plurality is the new brand of democracy, whose new 
foundation comes to the protection of minorities and a substantive agenda on 
Fundamental Rights. (CAPPELLETTI, 1993, p. 44).On this agenda is necessary 
to overcome two obstacles between at least two communicating individuals: the 
gnoseological and axiological abyss. The first takes up the idea that the limits of 
language mean the limits of the world (WITTGENSTEIN, 2010, p 245). This 
means that language, which is the coacervate of legal norm, is immanent (thus, 
limited), while the thought, which is the source the hierophany, is unlimited, 
transcendent. Hence, there will be mismatch between what the subject thinks and 
what he tries to convey through language23. The Axiologic Abyss, in turn, refers 
to the gap between values/moral systems, and occurs because of relative moral 
evaluations. Each individual shall have his worldviews, which were determined 
by the understanding of the cosmos arising from both, cognoscitive devices and 
socio-historical contingencies, especially religion.
The first step to skip both the abysses is in the “Undeniability of the Legal 
Standard”, which takes up the quarrel concerning retro-substantiation of the 
Legal Norm (KELSEN, 2003, p. 29). Under the basis that: i) the strict logic does 
not necessarily is consistent to a strict rationality; ii) it is impossible to prove any 
fact or knowledge of something by pure rationality, i.e., analytic sense a priori. 
23 In theory, religion itself can be viewed as linguistic device by which man denotes his last and 
irreconcilable concerns against ‘Pure Reason’ (TILLICH, 1958, p. 77).
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Consequently, one must recourse to Petitio Principii24, based on skepticism, 
leading to a temporary suspension of reason, in the order to pursue knowledge - 
particularly in this case, reasons for the rule itself, which allows the interpreter and 
legal operator to avoid inaction in the face of something that seems incognoscible. 
Then we must, paradoxically, absolutize relativism as the foundation of any Legal 
Theory in pace with the promotion of social dynamogeny. Thus, he only allowed 
justification for ideals like justice and democracy is a relativistic philosophy, i.e., 
a mere functional justification. Such reason leaves the decision concerning social 
value in charge of active individuals in the political reality (KELSEN, 1993, 
p.161).
In conclusion the immanence of legal norm should tangent religious 
transcendentalism, not to legitimize it, but to understand it. However, in such 
an effort, the jurist as hermeneutist should neither forget the Legal Doctrine, 
founded on a Critical rationality, nor the uniqueness of the human existential 
absurdity. In theory, as in Hermeneutic Circle (GADAMER 1975, p. 307), there 
must be a systematic process of understanding and interpretation, being the legal 
text read from its parts and those from the whole, whose meaning is transcends 
the immanence of the text itself.
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